Rebuilding the middle class to defend peace

In 2022, at the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I asked a question that, four years later, still carries all its urgency: can we defend peace without rebuilding a middle class capable of living, saving and imagining its own future? I did not mean to argue that income distribution alone explained a war, or that a tax reform could replace diplomacy. The underlying conviction was another: a society in which prosperity is concentrated in the hands of a few and economic security shrinks year after year becomes politically fragile too; it refuses to vote for a political class it feels has betrayed it, from right to left, and loses any sense of belonging to the life of the country. Today that conviction must be updated with data and more rigorous distinctions, but it seems no less relevant to me: peace requires institutions, security and a sense of responsibility from governments (which at the moment are entirely missing the point), but it also needs citizens who have concrete reasons to believe in cooperation rather than permanent confrontation.

The middle class has not disappeared, it has lost the margin for dreams

Talking about its disappearance is effective as a provocation, but it risks hiding the real problem: the middle class still exists; in many cases, however, it no longer recognizes the guarantees it associated with its position, since working, paying the bills, taking out a mortgage for a home, getting medical care and supporting children’s education are no longer necessarily the prelude to improvement, but instead become, for almost all Italians and Europeans, the entire content of disposable income, with no margin left for unexpected events and new life projects. It is this loss of margin, of dreams and expectations for the future, that produces insecurity.

Entry into the Monetary Union – since the Union of the peoples of Europe never came to pass – and the deep industrial and productive transformations driven by digital revolutions have slowly (but inexorably) extinguished the dream of the middle class, once flourishing, engaged and robust, which just thirty years ago saved 18% of income (with peaks of 25%, today we are at 6.7%) and built wealth, capable as it was of making it possible for 7 Italians out of 10 to become homeowners. Today, a household may remain statistically middle-income, yet feel exposed to the danger of a sudden worsening, especially if an installment, rent or health expense absorbs the share of income that once built the freedom to travel, take vacations, and cultivate hobbies and passions.

Savings measure the space left after expenses

The latest Istat data (National Institute of Statistics) show that in the second quarter of 2026 the propensity to save of consumer households was 6.7%, down by 1.2 percentage points from the previous quarter. Disposable income rose by 0.4%, spending by 1.7%, while purchasing power fell by 0.9%. The 6.7% figure is an aggregate, seasonally adjusted ratio for a quarter: it does not mean that every household manages to set aside that share, and it is not the final average for all of 2026. Its significance lies in the relationship between income and expenditure: when the latter grows faster than the former, savings absorb part of the imbalance.

The historical comparison remains meaningful as long as different series are not conflated. A study published by the Bank of Italy in 2013 reconstructed the fall in the saving rate of consumer households from more than 25% in the mid-1980s to 8.6% in 2011. That reconstruction and today’s quarterly figure belong to different publications and versions of national accounts: they should not be used to calculate an exact, uniform loss over forty years; they do, however, show that the decline in the ability to set money aside did not begin with the latest crisis. Demographic change, access to credit, income trends and the need to sustain consumption all contributed to reshaping it. Invoking the old strength of Italian savings is therefore legitimate; attributing all of its shrinking to a single political decision would not be.

A wealthy country can still have households with no margin

Assets must also be distinguished from income. Owning a home can be an important safeguard, but it does not generate the cash needed to pay day-to-day expenses. An inherited property may increase recorded wealth, but if disposable income remains modest, it complicates heirs’ finances in terms of maintenance, taxes and previously absent costs, creating liquidity imbalances and the resulting sale of part of the asset. Conversely, those who hold diversified financial assets can benefit from returns and revaluations without relying solely on their own work. Wealth concentration becomes socially problematic when these differences turn into a persistent gap in opportunity: some can choose, invest and wait, while others must spend every euro they earn or postpone care, training and projects. It is not enough to look at how many billions households collectively hold to conclude that their financial condition is healthy.

Savings also have a civic function, because they allow people to face a break in employment without immediately falling into poverty or hardship; they make it possible to change jobs, or perhaps to invest in a skill or help a child become independent. When that cushion thins, the emotional cost of any change rises, including changes that are necessary for collective growth. The energy transition, digitalization and artificial intelligence can open opportunities, but they require adjustments that not everyone can afford in the same way. This highly uneven distribution of income will widen the gap for those who are unable to seize those opportunities for lack of financial backing, even though they are perfectly old enough to do so. Many will be left behind, swelling the ranks of a poverty that will be functional first and foremost, before it is even economic.

From economic distress to political fracture

In these scenarios, the move toward conflict is not automatic, but gradual. Economic difficulties can initially generate solidarity, new forms of representation and democratic calls for reform; but at the same time they can fuel distrust, abstention and a willingness to accept explanations based on an enemy to be struck. Institutions and the quality of politics make the difference: when sacrifice seems shared and the outcome verifiable, a society may be willing to make major compromises and even support demanding corrections; when, instead, sacrifices appear permanent for some and negotiable for others, compromise loses any legitimacy.

For this reason, I remain convinced that a broad and reasonably secure middle class is one of democracy’s bulwarks. Not because middle incomes automatically make citizens moderate or peaceful, but because the possibility of improving one’s condition through shared rules gives concrete value to institutional continuity. Economic security makes it less costly to wait for the outcome of a reform, less destructive for a temporary crisis and more credible the promise of reciprocity between citizen and state. If the Middle Class is given the means to dream, that same economic security may also fade temporarily, but the sense of democracy remains firm and even the economic privileges of a few are seen with greater tolerance.

We cannot ask people to trust the future while continuously shrinking the economic space in which that future should take shape. The savings that vanish, the work that offers no protection and the services that become inaccessible are not problems separate from the quality of democracy, but part of its everyday substance. Four years later, therefore, my answer to the initial question remains this: rebuilding the middle class does not protect us from a war - especially if it is ‘imported’ by those who, from abroad, still hold large portions of our sovereignty - but refusing to do so weakens one of the foundations on which the duty to seek peace can stand.