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Real wages stuck at 1990 levels: what future for the Italian property market?

The purchasing power of work remains the weak point in housing demand. Without a lasting recovery in incomes, the risk is a market that becomes increasingly divided: difficult for families, selective for investors, and sustained by wealth already accumulated in the most sought-after locations

by Editorial teamPublished on
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Buying a home requires more than simply having access to a mortgage. It requires the ability to save the deposit, sustain a monthly instalment for many years and, at the same time, meet the other costs of life. It is at this balance that the Italian property market meets its deepest limit: the weakness of real wages, that is, pay measured after inflation is taken into account. If work does not allow purchasing power to rise, an increase in house prices can strengthen owners’ wealth and, at the same time, push out of the market those who still do not own a property.

The issue is not just how much flats will cost in the coming months. It is about who will be able to buy them. A property market supported mainly by past savings, family assistance and wealth transfers can continue to see transactions and value growth in some cities. But it becomes less accessible to those who rely mainly on their salary. That is why, before making any forecast, it is necessary to distinguish the resilience of prices from the ability of families to actually take part in the market.

The Italian divide: more than thirty years without any real wage growth

The international comparison makes Italy’s specificity clear. In the OECD series on average annual earnings per full-time equivalent employee, at constant prices, Italian real wages in 2025 are about 2.1% lower than in 1990. Over the same period, France posts an increase of about 34.6% and the United Kingdom 47.2%. For Germany, using 1991 as the starting point, the increase is around 35%. The comparison therefore covers roughly thirty-five years, not exactly thirty, and describes gross average earnings from dependent employment: not the net income of any individual family.

CountryLong-term real change2025 annual earnings in PPP dollars
Italy−2.1% since 199053,864
France+34.6% since 199060,483
Germany+35.0% since 199176,285
United Kingdom+47.2% since 199066,299
OECD data; changes rounded. Amounts adjusted for purchasing power are used for international comparison and do not correspond to pay converted at the current exchange rate. The German series used here starts in 1991.

The economic significance is considerable. In France, Germany and the United Kingdom, despite crises and setbacks along the way, the growth in wages has over the long term increased the resources potentially available for consumption, savings and housing. In Italy, that advance has been lacking. This does not mean that buying a home is easy abroad either: there too, local prices, taxation, interest rates and the availability of housing all matter. What it does mean is that the Italian worker faces the housing issue without having behind them a comparable recovery in purchasing power.

It is equally important not to confuse real wages with household disposable income. The latter also includes pensions, self-employed income, investment returns and transfers, net of taxes and contributions. It can rise because there are more earners in the household, even when the individual wage remains weak. To understand access to housing, both indicators are needed: how much work earns, and how much money is actually left in the family budget.

Over the past twelve months, work has once again lost ground

The problem is not confined to the past. In September 2026, Italian contractual hourly wages were up 2.5% on September 2025, while annual inflation stood at 4.2%. Comparing the two indices gives a real change of about −1.6%: a calculation of the purchasing power of contractual hourly wages, not an estimate of the overall income loss of every household. Istat also notes that, for the second consecutive quarter, growth in contractual wages was lower than that in prices.

The previous recovery had not, in any case, wiped out the losses accumulated. According to the Istat Annual Report 2026, at the end of 2025 contractual wages still showed an 8.6% loss in purchasing power compared with 2019. The OECD, in its Employment Outlook published this summer, forecasts a 0.9% decline in Italy’s real wages in 2026 and a recovery of just 0.2% in 2027. This is a forecast conditioned by economic developments, not a result already in the bag.

For those looking to buy, this weakness creates two distinct obstacles. The first is the instalment they can afford; the second, often less visible, is the difficulty of accumulating the initial capital. Even with an instalment compatible with the salary, there may be no money for the deposit, the ancillary costs and the cash needed to put the property in order. When food, energy and services take a larger share of income, the housing project is postponed before it even reaches the financing application stage.

House prices do not tell a single story

Saying that Italian house prices have remained essentially unchanged requires a clarification: it depends on the period, the area and whether one is looking at nominal or real values. A price that is unchanged in euro loses real value when the cost of living rises. Likewise, a national average can conceal growth in the most sought-after neighbourhoods and the weakness of properties in areas with little demand. The Italian average price, on its own, does not describe the home a young couple is looking for near their workplace.

The latest official data available still show increases. In the second quarter of 2026, the Istat index of house prices rose by 4% year on year: +5% for new builds and +3.7% for existing homes. Residential sales, according to OMI data cited by Istat, were instead almost flat, with an increase of 0.1%. Among the cities surveyed, Turin recorded +8.5%, Rome +6.4% and Milan +2.4%, the latter slowing from the previous quarter.

A subsequent survey, however, suggests greater caution. The Bank of Italy’s survey for the third quarter, published on 18 November 2026, found that estate agents reported a halt in the growth of prices: the balance between judgements of increases and decreases is close to zero. Both demand and intermediation supply are weakening, and operators’ expectations are deteriorating. This is a cyclical survey, different from Istat’s index of actual prices: it signals a change in mood, without on its own proving the start of a generalised decline.

Why weak wages do not immediately trigger a collapse

A home is not bought only with current income. It can be financed by selling another property, using savings or receiving family help. In addition, an owner who does not need to sell can wait rather than accept a cut in the price. The result may be an adjustment through fewer sales, longer negotiations and abandoning the purchase, rather than through an obvious correction in prices. This is an interpretation of market mechanisms, not a quantitative forecast.

Demand can also concentrate on a limited slice of the supply: well-connected, efficient homes, close to services and employment. If these properties are few, their value can hold up even in a context of stagnant real incomes. The result is only an apparent contradiction: many people cannot buy, but the most desirable properties do not automatically become cheaper. The adjustment lies in excluding part of the pool of buyers.

Flats for families: the segment most exposed

The segment most dependent on real incomes is that of ordinary homes bought to live in. Here, salary, job security, the cost of the mortgage and saving capacity all matter. If these elements do not improve, a broad and lasting rise in prices becomes harder to sustain. The most plausible scenario, all else being equal, is greater selectivity: stronger resilience for well-located properties and more pressure on those with flaws, high running costs or weak local demand.

The first concessions may concern size, location or quality. A household looks for a smaller flat, moves to a more distant suburb or accepts work to be tackled gradually. But even these adjustments have limits: greater distances mean transport and time; less efficient properties mean higher consumption and maintenance. A lower entry price does not necessarily make the overall cost of living in the property more affordable.

In areas with little employment and a declining population, the absence of growth in real incomes may be accompanied by a fall in potential buyers. In that case, discounts and sale difficulties become more likely. In attractive urban hubs, by contrast, demand may remain strong, but increasingly unrepresentative of households living on work alone. The decisive divide may therefore emerge within the same city, between neighbourhoods and types of property.

Shops and commercial property: the issue comes through consumption

For shops, the link with people’s income is less direct, but just as important. If households cut back on non-essential purchases, some businesses may struggle more to meet their rent. For the owner, this increases the risk of missed payments, the likelihood of having to renegotiate the contract and the periods when the unit stands empty. The value of the property depends on the income it can generate continuously, not just on the price paid for it in the past.

A purely illustrative example makes the mechanism clear. A unit capable of generating annual net operating income of 20,000 euros is worth 400,000 euros if valued at a yield of 5%. If income falls to 17,000 euros and the required yield rises to 6%, the theoretical value falls to about 283,000 euros. This is not a forecast for Italian shops: it shows how reduced takings can combine with a greater perception of risk.

Here too it is necessary to separate the markets. A retail street driven by tourism and international clientele responds to different factors from a neighbourhood shop. Offices, logistics and hospitality accommodation have further drivers. The weakness of national purchasing power weighs above all on businesses dependent on local spending and on properties that are hard to repurpose or re-let.

Prime property: greater autonomy, no immunity

Prime property can depend less on average Italian pay. Buyers may have financial assets, business income or resources from abroad. In this segment, scarcity of location, architectural quality and international appeal can support prices even when the family market loses momentum. It is therefore possible for the gap between ordinary properties and exclusive properties to widen.

Greater autonomy does not, however, amount to absolute protection. Even prime property is affected by the cost of capital, taxation and changes in financial wealth. Moreover, an expensive house is not necessarily a rare property: the asking price is not enough to turn a property into an exclusive asset. In a more selective market, the distinction between actual quality and the seller’s expectations can become even more important.

How much income is needed to regain affordability

The relationship between price and income helps to clarify the direction of adjustment. If a home costs 250,000 euros and a household has net annual income of 35,000 euros, the price amounts to about 7.1 years of income. With the price unchanged, if earnings rise to 42,000 euros, the ratio falls to about 6 years of income. To achieve the same result without increasing earnings, the price would have to fall to about 208,000 euros, or nearly 17%.

This is a simulation, not a bank threshold or a forecast of a fall. It does not take interest, deposit and ancillary costs into account. It does, however, show an essential point: affordability can improve through higher income, lower prices or a combination of the two. A longer loan can ease the instalment, but it prolongs debt; a lower rate can help, but it does not replace the ability to build up savings.

What can the state do

Public intervention can increase disposable income, for example by reducing the tax burden on work or by supporting the most vulnerable households in a targeted way. It can also reduce certain compulsory costs through services, transport and housing policies. For a household, having more resources after essential spending matters as much as an increase in gross pay. However, temporary support provides a less solid basis for a long-term financial commitment.

The risk arises when aid does nothing more than increase the ability to bid for a purchase without expanding the supply of homes. Where available properties are few, part of the benefit may be transferred into prices. Guarantees and incentives may help the individual buyer, but they do not automatically solve the collective problem of affordability. For this reason, support for demand should go hand in hand with the recovery of unused stock, affordable housing supply and better links between places of residence and work.

In the long term, what is also needed is growth in pay supported by productivity, stable employment and contract renewals. The confidence needed to buy does not come solely from the availability of an incentive: it comes from the reasonable expectation of being able to pay for the home without compromising everything else.

The outlook: a more divided market, even before a cheaper one

If real incomes do not recover to any significant extent, the central scenario is one of a less uniform property market: ordinary homes conditioned by local spending power, greater vulnerability for less sought-after properties, difficulties for a share of shops and relatively better resilience among rare properties and attractive locations. These are conditional economic scenarios, not percentage changes that can be indiscriminately attributed to the country as a whole.

A fall in prices can improve affordability, but much less so if it comes together with job losses, tighter credit and further reductions in income. To bring households back into the market with confidence, the purchase budget must become sustainable and remain so over time. Without this condition, prices may also hold up, but property will tend increasingly to depend on inherited wealth and less and less on wealth built up through work.

Sources and methodological note

OECD — Average annual wages
Series of average annual earnings per full-time equivalent employee, constant prices and purchasing power parities; data 1990/1991–2025. Changes rounded.
https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df[ag]=OECD.ELS.SAE&df[ds]=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&df[id]=DSD_EARNINGS@AV_AN_WAGE

OECD — Employment Outlook 2026, Italy
Forecasts for real wages in 2026 and 2027.
https://www.oecd.org/it/publications/prospettive-dell-occupazione-ocse-2026_7110bbbd-it/italia_5798d4c8-it.html

Istat — Annual Report 2026
Loss of purchasing power of contractual pay at the end of 2025 compared with 2019.
https://www.istat.it/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Sintesi-Rapporto-Annuale-2026-9giugno2026.pdf

Istat — Contractual pay, July–September 2026
Growth in hourly contractual pay and comparison with inflation.
https://www.istat.it/comunicato-stampa/retribuzioni-contrattuali-luglio-settembre-2026/

Istat — Consumer prices, September 2026
Final NIC and IPCA data. Real variation calculated by the editorial team: (1.025/1.042 − 1) × 100 ≈ −1.6%.
https://www.istat.it/comunicato-stampa/prezzi-al-consumo-settembre-2026/

Istat — House prices, Q2 2026
Price index, territorial data and OMI transactions trend.
https://www.istat.it/comunicato-stampa/prezzi-delle-abitazioni-dati-provvisori-ii-trimestre-2026/

Bank of Italy — Business survey on the housing market, Q3 2026
Published on 18 November 2026. Judgements of estate agents, distinct from the Istat transactions index.
https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizia/sondaggio-congiunturale-sul-mercato-delle-abitazioni-in-italia-3-trimestre-2026/

RealStats — Real wages by country
Cross-check of historical calculations based on OECD data and the different starting dates of the German series.
https://realstats.info/real-wages-by-country

The simulations on the price/income ratio and on the value of the retail unit are editorial examples, not market statistics. The segment scenarios are conditioned interpretations, not official forecasts by the bodies cited. Sources consulted: 19 November 2026.

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